### 2AC Wilderson F/L

#### And, your civil society links are wrong- black positionality and civil society aren’t always already defined by antagonism. The idea that civil society is corrupt ignores black agency throughout history- t’s the alt

Malczewski 11

Joan Malczewski is Assistant Professor of History and Social Studies in the Department of Humanities and the Social Sciences in the Professions at the Steinhardt School of Culture, Education and Human Development, New York University. *Journal of Policy History* Volume 23, Number 3, 2011

While progress was significantly slower in the Deep South, the Jeanes teachers there still promoted centralization and networks that could open opportunities for participation in policy development. A state network of Georgia Jeanes teachers issued monthly reports in order to share accomplishments and news with other teachers across the state, but also with the state division and with philanthropic agents, and the teacher in Dooley reported that a district teachers’ association meeting was held with representatives from seven counties present.115 In 1935, Helen Whiting was appointed the Georgia State Supervisor of Colored Elementary Schools in the Division of Negro Education, and began to administer reading achievement tests throughout the state by the end of her first year.116 She issued regular “itinerary reports” about her work in the field, including suggestions to teachers that would promote centralization, such as adopting the State Reading Program in counties and seeking assistance from the county supervisor.117 The Georgia state agent, reflecting upon a decade of progress, noted that “the State Agents for Negro Schools, unlike the other state school supervisors, are free to move in and out among both white and Negro groups without considering the political implications of every step taken . . . the counties in Georgia now provide secondary schools for Negroes at public expense . . ., [which] has been accomplished by visiting the various counties and outlining a program with the stimulus of state and philanthropic funds.”118 Much credit has been given to the black churches in the South for their role in community organizing, and where the church was administratively part of a broader national or state organization, it could have a profound role in connecting the community outward. However, the schools also had this ability through their connection to northern philanthropists, state and local political systems, and, as an institution that was largely ignored, as a site for mobilization. Teachers there were able to encourage institutional innovation at the local level. As society became more interdependent, this was a crucial link to the social and political structure that disenfranchisement kept out of reach, and an important institutional site for participating in the development of policy. Jackson Davis, acting as field agent for the GEB, was asked to describe the accomplishments of the Jeanes teachers. “They succeeded in organizing the people into school community associations and bringing to bear the united sentiment of the community in favor of better school buildings, longer terms and more practical work in the schools by introducing simple industries. . . . The schools lost their isolation.”119 Public-private collaboration was essential to education development in the South and ultimately resulted in a stronger centralized school system. The [End Page 346] concept of “agency” can be defined along a continuum that includes anything from subtle forms of resistance to group insurgency.120 However, black teachers were able to engage with collaborative relationships, and in doing so exercised agency more broadly defined, helped to establish centralized administrative capacity in the lower tiers of government, and undermined the strength of sectional interests. It is not possible truly to understand black agency in the South without understanding the institutional venues in which it operated. Schooling helped to make political opportunity structures more permeable. In addition to people like Annie Holland and Helen Whiting, public-private collaboration and centralization also provided venues for blacks like W. T. B. Williams, who served as a field agent for the Jeanes Fund, and Hollis Frissel as principal of the Tuskegee Institute, to have significant influence on policy decision that affected rural communities. The actions of individual reformers were important, but it is essential also to understand the broader dynamic of interest groups and institutions that challenged the political structure. Schooling provided an institutional venue for rural blacks to mobilize, and it should be placed more centrally in the reform dynamic as an early institutional site for the mobilization of blacks. Rural black reformers recognized the value of promoting an education system not just as an end in itself, especially given the value placed on it as the antithesis to slavery, but also as a means to create avenues for greater participation in the political and social structure. They participated in the expansion of government at the local level through their efforts to create organizational capacity, and promoted voluntary organizations that created a common culture within and beyond local communities and broadened frames of support for their own agenda.121 In this regard, both conceptually and institutionally, “education” became the central meeting point for reformers, and the place in which organizational forms, parallel structures, and new identities were created ultimately to overcome southern opposition to educational advancement. Both of these ideals converged in the form of schooling, which became a unifying organizational venue. Local school-based organizations became central to the creation of a more bureaucratic state by facilitating the institutionalism of reforms at the local level and providing links to policy initiatives that emerged from philanthropists and their agents outside the community. It would be overstating it to make the claim that the black community mobilized between 1909 and 1935 as an organized interest group in the South, or to claim that it had a formally defined role in policy development. However, education reformers were able to mobilize the community through [End Page 347] schooling in a more organized manner than has been recognized. Schools helped to promote expanding political opportunities, organizational strength, and shared cognitions in the community.122 The black community, especially through the work of the Jeanes teachers, was able to utilize the organizational repertoires of schooling to connect local institutions to the political structures outside rural communities, creating political innovation and promoting reform. Southern blacks did indeed have an instrument for constructing new collective identities; schooling served as a link to alternative models of political organization and participation far earlier than what has typically been attributed to the community. Through schools, teachers were able to exploit and even initiate the public-private collaborations that developed between philanthropists and state and local governments in order to institutionalize reforms, especially through state centralization. The insurgency that developed in later decades is indebted to the organizational structures and community mobilization that occurred through schooling.

#### Even their premise is true, we can use other standards for knowledge to struggle for change- proven in movements like Civil Rights and Feminist movements-

Our approach to the aff creates a system of hope that’s better than the alt- positivism fuels progressive engagement and rethinking of power relations, and spurs possibilities for future change

Giroux, 2004

[Henry, When Hope is Subversive, Tikkun Vol. 19, No. 6, http://www.henryagiroux.com/online\_articles/Tikkun%20piece.pdf] /Wyo-MB

Is it possible to imagine hope for justice and humanity¶ after the torture of Iraqi detainees (including some just¶ in their teens) by American soldiers at Abu Ghraib¶ prison? What does hope mean when the United States¶ is virtually unchallenged as it incarcerates unprecedented¶ numbers of young people of color? What does hope teach¶ us at a time in which government lies and deception are exposed on a daily basis in the media and yet appear to have¶ little effect on President Bush’s popular support? What resources and visions does hope offer in a society where greed¶ is considered venerable and profit is the most important¶ measure of personal achievement and social advance? What¶ is the relevance of hope at a time when most attempts to interrupt the operations of an incipient fascism appear to fuel¶ a growing cynicism rather than promote widespread individual and collective acts of resistance? ¶ It is hard not to believe that politics in American life has¶ become corrupt, that progressive social change is a distant¶ memory, or that hope is the last refuge of deluded romantics. Civic engagement seems irrelevant in light of the growing power of multinational corporations to privatize public¶ space and time. We have less time—and fewer civic¶ spaces—for experiencing ourselves as political agents. Market values replace social values. Power has become disconnected from issues of equity, social justice, and civic¶ responsibility. People with the education and means appear¶ more and more willing to retreat into the safe, privatized enclaves of the family, religion, and consumption. Those without the luxury of such choices pay a terrible price in what¶ Zygmunt Bauman, in his book Globalization, has called the¶ “hard currency of human suffering. ” ¶ Given these social conditions, some theorists have suggested that democratic politics as a site of contestation, critical exchange, and engagement has come to an end. We¶ must not give up so easily. Democracy has to be struggled¶ over, even in the face of a most appalling crisis of educational opportunity and political agency. Cynicism breeds apathy—not the reverse. The current depressing state of our¶ politics and the bankruptcy of our political language issues¶ a challenge to us to formulate a new language and vision that¶ can reframe questions of agency, ethics, and meaning for a¶ substantive democracy.¶ Crafting such a new political language will require what I¶ call “educated hope.” Hope is the precondition for individual and social struggle. Rather than seeing it as an individual proclivity, we must see hope as part of a broader politics¶ that acknowledges those social, economic, spiritual, and cultural conditions in the present that make certain kinds of¶ agency and democratic politics possible. With this understanding, hope becomes not merely a wistful attempt to look¶ beyond the horizon of the given, but what Andrew Benjamin, in Present Hope, calls “a structural condition of the¶ present.” ¶ The philosopher Ernst Bloch provides essential theoretical insights on the importance of hope. He argues that hope¶ must be concrete, a spark that not only reaches out beyond¶ the surrounding emptiness of capitalist relations, anticipating a better world in the future, but a spark that also speaks¶ to us in the world we live in now by presenting tasks based¶ on the challenges of the present time. In The Utopian Function of Art and Literature, Bloch argues that hope cannot be¶ removed from the world. Hope is not “something like nonsense or absolute fancy; rather it is not yet in the sense of a¶ possibility; that it could be there if we could only do something for it.” ¶ In this view, hope becomes a discourse of critique and¶ social transformation. Hope makes the leap for us between¶ critical education, which tells us what must be changed; political agency, which gives us the means to make change; and¶ the concrete struggles through which change happens.¶ Hope, in short, gives substance to the recognition that every¶ present is incomplete. For theorists such as Bloch and his¶ more contemporary counterparts like Michael Lerner, Cornel West, and Robin D.G. Kelley, hope is anticipatory rather¶ than messianic, mobilizing rather than therapeutic. Understood this way, the longing for a more humane society does¶ not collapse into a retreat from the world but becomes a¶ means to engage with present behaviors, institutional formations, and everyday practices. Hope in this context does¶ not ignore the worst dimensions of human suffering, exploitation, and social relations; on the contrary, as Thomas¶ Dunn writes, it acknowledges the need to sustain the “capacity to see the worst and offer more than that for our consideration” (in Vocations of Political Theory, edited by Jason¶ A. Frank and John Tambornino). ¶ Hence, hope is more than a politics, it is also a pedagogical and performative practice that provides the foundation¶ for enabling human beings to learn about their potential as¶ moral and civic agents. Hope is the outcome of those educational practices and struggles that tap into memory and lived¶ experiences while at the same time linking individual re-sponsibility with a progressive sense of social change. As a¶ form of utopian longing, educated hope opens up horizons¶ of comparison by evoking not just different histories but different futures. Educated hope is a subversive force when it¶ pluralizes politics by opening up a space for dissent, making¶ authority accountable, and becoming an activating presence¶ in promoting social transformation.¶ There is a long history in the United States of hope as a¶ subversive force. Examples are evident in the struggles of¶ the Civil Rights and feminist movements in the 1950s and¶ 1960s against racism, poverty, sexism, and the war in Vietnam. More recent examples can be found among young¶ people demonstrating against multinational corporations¶ and the World Trade Organization in cities as diverse as¶ Melbourne, Seattle, and Genoa. Hope was on full display¶ among organized labor, intellectuals, students, and workers¶ protesting together in the streets of New York City against¶ Bush’s policies and his followers at the Republican National¶ Convention. ¶ This is not to say that a politics and pedagogy of hope is¶ a blueprint for the future: it is not. What hope offers is the¶ belief, simply, that different futures are possible. In this way,¶ hope can become a subversive force, pluralizing politics by¶ opening up a space for dissent, contingency, indeterminancy. “For me,” writes Judith Butler, “there is more hope in¶ the world when we can question what is taken for granted,¶ especially about what it is to be human” (cited by Gary¶ Olson and Lynn Worsham in JAC20:4). Zygmunt Bauman¶ in a conversation with Keith Tester (in Conversations with¶ Zygmunt Bauman) goes further, arguing that the resurrection of any viable notion of political and social agency is dependent upon a culture of questioning, the purpose of¶ which, as he puts it, is to “keep the forever unexhausted¶ and unfulfilled human potential open, fighting back all attempts to foreclose and pre-empt the further unravelling of¶ human possibilities, prodding human society to go on questioning itself and preventing that questioning from ever¶ stalling or being declared ﬁnished.” ¶ The goal of educated hope is not to liberate the individual from the social–a central tenet of neoliberalism—but to¶ take seriously the notion that the individual can only be liberated through the social. Educated hope as a subversive,¶ defiant practice should provide a link, however transient,¶ provisional, and contextual, between vision and critique on¶ the one hand, and engagement and transformation on the¶ other. That is, for hope to be consequential it has to be¶ grounded in a project that has some hold on the present.¶ Hope becomes meaningful to the degree that it identifies¶ agencies and processes, offers alternatives to an age of profound pessimism, reclaims an ethic of compassion and justice, and struggles for those institutions in which equality,¶ freedom, and justice ﬂourish as part of the ongoing struggle¶ for a global democracy.

#### Alt replicates colonialist violence

#### Focus on the black body and the centrality of the slave occludes the dispossession of indigenous populations that made slavery in the U.S. possible in the first place.

Moreton-Robinson 8

(Aileen, Queensland University Prof of Indigenous Studies, Transnational Whiteness Matters)kh

Whiteness studies proliferated in the United States during the 1990s in response to overt acts of racist violence reported in the press and the need to reconsider the persistence of racism in light of the proposition that race was socially constructed and not biologically determined. Whiteness studies scholars share in common their commitment to racial justice, anti-racism and a more humane society. In most of the literature, prescriptive politics assume a central role; many writers are committed to the abolition of whiteness through naming it, deconstructing it, resisting it and betraying it. Their scholarship is informed by a variety of disciplines such as literary studies, cultural studies, anthropology, feminism, ptostcolonialism, sociology and history while their research methods include textual analysis ethnography, interviews, surveys and the archival. Whiteness studies has entered Canada and crossed both the Pacific and Atlantic providing a new history of race and modernity in 'settler' colonies.1 However, the United States of America remains one of the most productive sites for whiteness studies.2 A field of studies that is full of contradictions and ambivalences as well as sympathetic critics. Mike Hill argues that "the contradictions surrounding whiteness studies remain one of its most salient and worthwhile features . .. the study of whiteness was never- and with hard enough work will never be- an unproblematically unified institutional force."3 Debates about the epistemological assumptions and approaches to whiteness within the field continue to abound. Robyn Wiegman surmises that the contradictory nature of white power has been underplayed by Dyer and other white stud ies scholars through claiming its invisibility and universality as the source of its power. Wiegman argues that the universal serves to work in the interests of white particularity. This particularity simultaneously distances itself from white supremacy and denies the benefits of white power creating a disassociation that takes the form of "liberal whiteness, a colour blind moral sameness."4 Peter Kolchin critiques whiteness studies for its lack of historical specificity and the claim that whiteness is everything or nothing leads him to question whether it is a useful tool of enquiry and explanation. He argues that "underlying the new interest in white power, privilege and identity there is evident an intense discouragement over the persistence of racism, the unexpected renewal of nationalism, and the collapse of progressive movements for social change. While Stephen Knadler cautions whiteness studies scholars against "an increasing linguistic slippage from the fiction of race into the fiction of racism."6 The pliable morphology of whiteness, its utilization of the universal, the lack of historical specificity and the linguistic slippage that fictionalizes racism as problems have shaped this paper's consideration of the relationship of this field of study to Indigenous sovereignties. The field of Whiteness studies is not a uniquely white enterprise, African Americans have commented on and written about whiteness since the early 1800s.7 African American scholarship has been influential, particularly the work of W. E. B. Du Bois and more recently Toni Morrison whose seminal text Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination challenged the naturalized whiteness of American l.iterature by illuminating how the omnipresence of African Americans has historically shaped it. 8 She exposes the embedded racial assumptions that enable whiteness to characterize itself in the literary imagination in powerful and important ways. In her analysis of Hemmingway's To Have and to Have Not, Morrison illustrates how black men and women were positioned as inferiors within his texts to prop up white masculinity .9 Morrison further suggests in " Black Matters" that the African American presence has also "shaped the body politic, the Constitution, and the entire history of the [USA] culture." Indigenous peoples are outside the scope of Morrison's analysis. Through the centering of the African American presence, Native American texts that have challenged, resisted and affected the American literary imagination, politics, history and the Constitution remain invisible. This silence is an interesting discursive move considering that the best-selling novels within the USA in the late eighteenth century were captivity narratives. And as Native American legal scholar Raymond Williams argues it was the positioning of Indians as incommensurable savages within the Declaration of Independence that enabled " ' the Founders' vision of America's growth and potentiality as a new form of expansionary white racial dictatorship in the world."ll The most valuable contribution of Morrison's work for my purposes is her thesis that "blackness," whether real or imagined, services the social construction and application of whiteness in its myriad forms. In this way it is utilized as a white epistemological possession. Her work opens up a space for considering how this possessiveness operates within the whiteness studies literature to displace Indigenous sovereignties and render them invisible. WHITE POSSESSIVENESS Most historians mark 1492 as the year when imperialism began to construct the old world order by taking possession of other people, their lands and resources. The possessive nature of this enterprise informed the development of a racial stratification process on a global scale that became solidified during modernity. Taking possession of Indigenous people's lands was a quintessential act of colonization and was tied to the transition from the Enlightenment to modernity, which precipitated the emergence of a new subject into history within Europe. Major social, legal, economic and political reforms had taken place changing the feudal nature of the relationship between persons and property in the 16th and 18th centuries. "These changes centered upon the rise of 'possessive individualism,' that is, upon an increasing consciousness of the distinctness of each self-owning human entity as the primary social and political value. "12 Private ownership of property both tangible and intangible operated through mechanisms of the new nation state in its regulation of the population and especially through the law. By the late 1700s people could legally enter into different kinds of contractual arrangements whereby they could own land, sell their labor and possess their identities all of which were formed through their relationship to capital and the state. A new white property owning subject emerged into history and possessiveness became embedded in everyday discourse as "a firm belief that the best in life was the expansion of self through property and property began and ended with possession of one's body."13 Within the realm of intra-subjectivity possession can mean control over one's being, ideas, one's mind, one's feelings and one's body or within inter-subjectivity it can mean the act or fact of possessing something that is beyond the subject and in other contexts it can refer to a state of being possessed by another. Within the law possession can refer to holding or occupying territory with or without actual ownership or a thing possessed such as property or wealth and it can also refer to territorial domination of a state. At an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one's will-la-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed. This enables the formally free subject to make the thing its own. Ascribing one's own subjective will onto the thing is required to make it one's property as " willful possession of what was previously a will-less thing constitutes our primary form of embodiment; it is invoked whenever we assert: this is minc."14 To be able to assert ' this is mine' requires a subject to internalize the idea that one has proprietary rights that are part of nonnative behavior, rules of interaction and social engagement. Thus possession that forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity is reinforced by its sociodiscursive functioning. WHITE WRITING A number of texts have been written historicizing the acquisition of white identity and the privileges conferred by its status through a trope of migration, which is based on the assumption that all those who came after the white people had taken possession are the immigrants. White possession of the nation works discursively within these texts to displace Native American sovereignties by disavowing that everyone else within the USA are immigrants whether they came in chains or by choice. The only displacement that is theorized is in relation to African Americans. Theodore Allen's work on how the Irish became white in America illustrates that the transformation of their former status as the blacks of Europe relied on their displacement by African Americans in the new country. IS David Roediger di scusses how the wages of whiteness operated to prevent class alliances between working class whites and African Americans. 16 Karen Brodkin 's excellent book on how Jews became white demonstrates that the lower status of African American workers enabled Jewish class mobility.17 Jacobsen illustrates that European migrants were able to become white through ideological and political means that operated to distinguish them from African American blackness.18 The black/white binary permeates these analyses enabling tropes of migration and slavery to work covertly in these texts erasing the continuing history of colonization and the Native American sovereign presence. Blackness becomes an epistemological possession that Allen, Roediger, Brodkin and Jacobsen deploy[ed] in analyzing whiteness and race, which forecloses the possibility that the dispossession of Native Americans was tied to migration and the establishment of slavery driven by the logic of capital. Slaves were brought to America as the property of white people to work the land that was appropriated from Native America tribes. Subsequently, migration became a means to enhance capitalist development within the USA. Migration, slavery and the dispossession of Native Americans were integral to the project of nation building. Thus the question of how anyone came to be white or black in the United States of America is inextricably tied to the dispossession of the original owners and the assumption of white possession. The various assumptions of sovereignty beginning with British 'settlers' the formation of individual states and subsequently the United States of America all came into existence through the blood-stained taking of Native American land. The USA as a white nation state cannot exist without land and clearly defined borders, it is the legally defined and asserted territorial sovereignty that provides the context for national identifications of whiteness. In this way I argue Native American dispossession indelibly marks configurations of white national identity. Ruth Frankenberg acknowledges in the introduction to her edited collection Displaying Whiteness that whiteness traveled culturally and physically, impacting on the formation of nationhood, class and empire sustained by imperialism and global capitalism. She wrote that notions of race were tied "to ideas about legitimate 'ownership' of the nation, with 'whiteness' and' Americanness' linked tightly together" and that this history was repressed. After making this statement she then moves on to discuss immigration and its effects. 19 Her acknowledgement did not progress into critical analysis that centered Native American dispossession, instead Frankenberg represses that which she acknowledges is repressed . Repression operates as a defense mechanism to protect one's perception of self and reality from an overwhelming trauma that may threaten in order to maintain one's self image. Repressing the history of Native American dispossession works to protect the possessive white self from ontological disturbance. It is far easier to extricate oneself from the history of slavery if there were no direct family and material ties to its institution and reproduction. However, it is not as easy to distance one's self from a history of Indigenous dispossession when one benefits everyday from being tied to a nation that has and continues to constitute itself as a white possession. Within the whiteness studies literature whiteness has been defined in multiple ways. It is usually perceived as unnamed, umnarked and invisible, and often as culturally empty operating only by appropriation and absence .20 It is a location of structural privilege, a subject position and cultural Praxis. Whiteness constitutes the norm operating within various institutions influencing decision making and defining itself by what it is not. 22 It is socially constructed and is a form of property that one possesses, invests in and profits from.2..1 Whiteness as a social identity works discursively becoming ubiquitous, fluid and dynamic24 operating invisibly through pedagogy.25 What these different definitions of whiteness expose is that it is something that can be possessed and it is tied to power and dominance despite being fluid, vacuous and invisible to white people. However, these different conceptualizations of whiteness, which use blackness as an epistemological possession to service what it is not, obscure the more complex way that white possession functions sociodiscursively through subjectivity and knowledge production. As something that can be possessed by subjects it must have ontological and epistemological anchors in order to function through power. As a means of controlling differently racialized populations enclosed within the borders of a given society, white subjects are disciplined, though to different degrees, to invest in the nation as a white possession that imbues them with a sense of belonging and ownership. This sense of belonging is derived from ownership as understood within the logic of capital and citizenship. In its self-legitimacy, white possession operates discursively through narratives of the home of the brave and the land of the free and through white male signifiers of the nation such as the Founding Fathers, the 'pioneer' and the 'war hero.' Against this stands the Indigenous sense of belonging, home and place in its sovereign incommensurable difference.

#### Alt recreates racial divisions- leaves no interspace for those who don’t meet defined categories of African American-

Sexton 10

Jared Sexton Crit Sociol 2010 36: 87

However, the notion of an ‘endemic’ black-white model of racial thought is something of **a social fiction** – one might say a misreading – that depends upon a reduction of the sophistication of the paradigm in question. Once that reduction is performed, the fiction can be deployed for a range of political and intellectual purposes (Kim 2006). In addressing the call to displace the black-white paradigm, we may recognize that its purported institutionalization indicates more about the enduring force of anti-blackness (Gordon 1995, 1998) than the insistence of black scholars, activists or communities more generally.9 When broaching the ‘explanatory difficulty’ (Omi andWinant 1993: 111) of present-day racial politics, then, one wonders exactly who and what is addressed by the demand to go ‘beyond black and white’. One finds a litany of complicating factors and neglected subjects, but it is accompanied by a failure to account cogently for the implications of this newfound complexity. The recently appointed Dean of the Wayne State University Law School, Frank Wu, has written: ‘“beyond black and white” is an oppositional slogan … it names itself ironically against the prevailing tradition…It is easy enough to argue that society needs a new paradigm, but it is much harder to explain how such an approach would work in actual practice.’ (Wu 2006: xi) It is harder still to explain why such an approach should be adopted. In fact, the implementation of the ‘new paradigm’ of racial theory seems **unfeasible** because it does not – and perhaps cannot – develop a coherent ethical justification as an attempt to analyze and contest racism. Taken together, these ambiguities beg a key question: what economy of enunciation, what rhetorical distribution of sanctioned speaking positions and claims to legitimacy are produced by the injunction to end ‘biracial theorizing’ (Omi and Winant 1994: 154)? In pursuing this question, consider the following provocation by another noted legal scholar, MariMatsuda (2002), offered at a 1997 symposium on critical race theory at the Yale Law School: When we say we need to move beyond Black and white, this is what a whole lot of people say or feel or think: ‘Thank goodness we can get off that paradigm, because those Black people made me feel so uncomfortable. I know all about Blacks, but I really don’t know anything about Asians, and while we’re deconstructing that Black-white paradigm, we also need to reconsider the category of race altogether, since race, as you know, is a constructed category, and thank god I don’t have to take those angry black people seriously anymore’ (Matsuda 2002: 395). It is important to note that this contention, like those of Ture and Hamilton and Wu above, is not issued against progressive political coalition, but rather is drawn from a sympathetic meditation on the need for more adequate models of racial analysis and strategies of multiracial alliance-building in and beyond the US context.What Matsuda polemically identifies are dangers attendant to the unexamined desire for new analyses and the anxious drive for alliance, namely, the tendency to gloss over discrepant histories, minimize inequalities born of divergent structural positions, and disavow the historical centrality and uniqueness of anti-blackness for the operations of ‘global white supremacy’ (Mills 1998). Matsuda urges the refusal of what historian DavidHollinger (2003) has coined the ‘one-hate rule’ or the presumption of ‘the monolithic character of white racism’. By calling to question the motive force of a nominally critical intervention on the black-white paradigm, Matsuda traces a fault line in the field formation of Asian American Studies that marks an opening for the present inquiry. It seems that the question of anti-black racism troubles contemporary efforts at mediation among the non-white – between black and non-black communities of color – and interpolates ‘Asian American panethnicity’ (Espiritu 1992) in ways that exceed even the immanent critique of that conceptual touchstone and principle of organization (Lowe 1996; Ono 1995). If one of the benefits of a reconstructed racial theory addressing ‘the increasing complexity of racial politics and racial identity today’ (Omi and Winant 1994: 152) is its capacity to grasp ‘antagonisms and alliances among racially defined minority groups’ (1994: 154), that political-intellectual enterprise **is not without hazard**.10

#### Colonialism DA-

#### Imagining the black body as unable to generate an ontology, subjectivity or history essentializes and recreates colonialism

Maty Ba 11

(Saer, Professor of Film Studies at Portsmouth University in the UK, researches race, postcolonialism, diaspora, the transnational and film ‘genre’, African and Carribean Cinemas and Film Festivals. “The US Decentred: From Black Social Death to Cultural Transformation,” Cultural Studies Review 17:2, September,)

Red, White and Black is particularly undermined by Wilderson’s propensity for exaggeration and blinkeredness. In chapter nine, ‘“Savage” Negrophobia’, he writes: The philosophical anxiety of Skins is all too aware that through the Middle Passage, African culture became Black ‘style’ ... Blackness can be placed and displaced with limitless frequency and across untold territories, by whoever so chooses. Most important, there is nothing real Black people can do to either check or direct this process ... Anyone can say ‘nigger’ because anyone can be a ‘nigger’. (235)7 Similarly, in chapter ten, ‘A Crisis in the Commons’, Wilderson addresses the issue of ‘Black time’. Black is irredeemable, he argues, because, at no time in history had it been deemed, or deemed through the right historical moment and place. In other words, the black moment and place are not right because they are ‘the ship hold of the Middle Passage’: ‘the most coherent temporality ever deemed as Black time’ but also ‘the “moment” of no time at all on the map of no place at all’. (279) Not only does Pinho’s more mature analysis expose this point as preposterous (see below), I also wonder what Wilderson makes of the countless historians’ and sociologists’ works on slave ships, shipboard insurrections and/during the Middle Passage,8 or of groundbreaking jazz‐studies books on cross‐cultural dialogue like The Other Side of Nowhere (2004). Nowhere has another side, but once Wilderson theorises blacks as socially and ontologically dead while dismissing jazz as ‘belonging nowhere and to no one, simply there for the taking’, (225) there seems to be no way back. It is therefore hardly surprising that Wilderson ducks the need to provide a solution or alternative to both his sustained bashing of blacks and anti‐ Blackness.9 Last but not least, Red, White and Black ends like a badly plugged announcement of a bad Hollywood film’s badly planned sequel: ‘How does one deconstruct life? Who would benefit from such an undertaking? The coffle approaches with its answers in tow.’ (340) —PINHO AS FRESH AIR: AFRO-MYTHS AND BLACK ATLANTIC IDENTITIES Pinho favours detailed and measured presentation of an idea, term or argument, followed by an equally in‐depth and careful critique. Her book is a breath of fresh air because, for one thing, Pinho knows that what blacks must breathe is called air and that it shall keep them alive. Metaphorically, of course, breathing means being aware that for scattered blacks Africa is not necessarily a nation‐state or place of return. Rather, Africa can be an ‘imaginary community’, (25) albeit one which entails mythic connections to Africa‐as‐place. Lucid and fair, Pinho unambiguously identifies and critiques such linkages through the myth of ‘Mama Africa’. Thus, Pinho focuses on what the term ‘myth’ means and three reasons for choosing it to study the blocos afro’s (Carnival Afro) reinventions of Mama Africa. Myth embodies the subtleties and power of narratives explaining and interpreting the world. Myth carries ‘values, messages, and ideals’ and is therefore crucial to dispersed peoples’ self‐produced stories and representations (2) while connected to and contaminating ‘reality’. (20) For example, Mama Africa generates and is in turn generated by identities, and only at the zones of contact between myth and identity can one hope to grasp its meaning. Bahia’s own version is a ‘metaphysical’ nourishing body at once ‘source of [racial] purity’ and ongoing dispenser of the essence of black life. (30) Bahia activates this myth through different means: music, aesthetics and religion (32–3); the blocos afro’s Africa as ‘the “place of origin” of Afro‐Brazilian ancestors’; and how it extends to countries in the African diaspora, such as Jamaica, Cuba and the USA, envisioned ‘as branches of Mama Africa’. (39) Crucially, Pinho notes that the Bahian Mama Africa does not own her body, while the myth itself echoes problematic representations of black womanhood. (30) Invoking such representations signals Pinho’s serious commitment to seriously examining blackness as diasporic. For example, she investigates the role agency plays in embracing Afro‐aesthetics (86) while arguing that a deeper meaning of such embrace comes from both an ongoing process of imagining and reinventing Africa (121) and that, in Brazil, adopting Afro‐aesthetics changes according to age, gender, geography and political commitment to ‘the black social movement’. (125) But what does the ‘Afro’ of Afro‐Bahian identities mean? Several things, according to Pinho: to embody Mama Africa through difference and by manipulating the body (89); tradition, for example, ‘rhythms believed to originate from Africa’; ‘purity’, such as the ability to remain faithful to African roots (90) or, as Nelson Mendes of the bloco Olodum states in an interview, to defend ‘the proposal of moving beyond boundaries’. (95) Therefore ‘Afro’ seems to signify an acknowledgement that race and blackness cannot exist separately while black identities must be mutable. (96–7) And yet, the blocos’ anti‐racist discourse keeps on retreating (in)to the body, and consequently undermines both the race‐blackness connection and mutability of black identities: why? —‘AFRICA’ IN BODY AND SOUL: PINHO AGAINST POLICING THE BLACK BODY Why? Because in Brazil the ‘alleged smell of the slaves’ bodies became an additional excuse for classifying them closer to animals than to humans’. (105) Attitudes resulting from this mindset permeate ways in which the body remains a place in which to reinscribe Africa as source of beauty and restoration of dignity. Additionally, nowadays black bodies are present(ed) positively in Brazil’s shopping malls, magazines, TV/soap operas, advertisements, and education. The blocos afro, created in the 1970s ‘under the influence of’ the US Black is Beautiful movement, can take credit for this presence’. (115) In other words, blocos afro develop a black identity through stories of ‘Africanness and representations of blackness’, an identity aligned with their ‘strategies of social promotion [connecting] discourse and practice ... culture and politics’. (117) It would be preposterous to talk about black Brazilians as socially § Marked 12:07 § or ontologically dead. At the same time, to take issues with Afro‐Brazilian activists’ and blocos’ anti‐racist discourse seems an arduous task. This is because it is grounded in engagement with history, place, federal and local government race policies (or race denials), and day‐to‐day anti‐black racism. Nevertheless, as Pinho rightly remarks, this anti‐racist discourse overlooks gender analysis: seldom do activists and blocos make reference to how ‘racism affects men and women differently’ while they fail ‘to question’ their own sexism, which leads to the female black body remaining ‘the preferred locus for performing the pedagogy of blackness’ through black beauty pageants for example. (136) Pinho objects to the policing of black women’s bodies, opposes notions of ethnic black identities and Mama Africa (158) at the same time as she finds linkages between biology, culture and politics problematic. Her suggested alternatives are most enlightening: one must remember that identities ... are constructed in the context of late capitalism, in which liberalism and discipline, coupled with bureaucracy, impinge on the most subjective conditions of identities ... we need to envision the possibility of constructing identities that are not based on the same terms that emerged out of colonialism and that circulated as a means to legitimize subordination and power. (175) —SOUR MILK AND CULTURAL TRANSFORMATION: PINHO AGAINST AFROCENTRISM Pinho’s above suggestions can be, but are not easily, achieved. At the time of (her) writing it was no longer a question of if, but one of how, to see the fusion of black culture with baianidade/Bahian culture. Aware of this issue, she suggests that we step out of ‘Manichean and superficial’ Afrocentrism so as to see the largely ‘artificial’ character of classifications ‘black culture’ and ‘Bahian culture’ and to take into account ‘the agency of cultural producers’. (1989) Accordingly, I find stimulating Pinho’s courage to declare that to objectify identities does not necessarily create estrangement; without objectification cultures cannot expand and reproduce, (209) and cultural transformation needs to be promoted. In turn, to transform culture demands a re‐thinking of what equality means because: Equal should not be understood as same ... To see equality as sameness is like viewing racelessness as whiteness. It is a formulation that allows ‘white’ to be the neutral standard from which black differs; or ‘man’ to be the neutral standard against which women are compared. (220–1) Put simply, I welcome the above statement and Pinho’s overall thesis. I wish Wilderson paid attention to books like Pinho’s, Cedric J. Robinson’s Black Marxism (1983) or W.E.B. DuBois’s Black Reconstruction in America (1935), and to the ideas of Kwame A. Appiah, Cornel West, Marc Reed, Simone de Beauvoir, Eric Robert Taylor, to name but a few. Had Wilderson done so, his book could have been balanced. Red, White and Black is of almost no use to film studies scholars. I find it additionally useless because I believe that the USA is not the world’s centre, and that US antagonisms, related to cinema or not, are always‐already multiply outer‐ national.

#### Effacing violence DA-

#### They very act of starting with slavery effaces the violence committed against the Native Americans, allows the continuation of colonialist violence against them and makes sovereignty impossible- impact is case

Moreton-Robinson 8

(Aileen, Queensland University Prof of Indigenous Studies, Transnational Whiteness Matters) KH

Despite the colonial history of the United States and racializing Native Americans in popular culture, as the embodiment of ' redness,' the whiteness literature makes a racial demarcation between African Americans and Native Americans. That is by making blackness synonymous with 'race' African Americans are placed in a reified position within the literature. This binary understanding of 'race' places the literature in one sense Qut of colonial history. That is the theorizing about whiteness does not begin with nor center the appropriation of Indigenous peoples' lands and the continuing sovereignty struggles with the US nation state. They are, but they are marginalized within the theories of race and whiteness offered by whiteness studies despite its political commitment to and epistemological engagement with white race privilege and power. The conceptual links between the privileges and benefits that flow from American citizenship to Native American dispossession remains invisible. Instead slavery, war and migration are the narratives by which the historically contingent positionality of whiteness unfolds. This reflects a failure to address the sociodiscursive way that white possession functions to produce racism. The racism attending the sociodiscursive nature of white possession informed the establishment of the Advisory Board of Race in 1997. President Clinton established this Board to counsel and inform him about race and racial reconciliation couching the terms of reference within a civil rights framework.44 No Native American representative was appointed to the Board even though they are the only racial group required to carry a blood quantum card as proof of tribal membership.45 This exclusion was the catalyst for numerous protests by different Native American groups. They stated that while Native Americans shared with other racial groups the need for improving their socioeconomic and legal conditions, there were other conditions not shared. They argued that their position within the USA was unique because of their sovereignties and treating with the Nation State. The racism that they experience is predicated on this relationship. Native American sovereignty is constantly under threat by the Nation State and its various mechanisms of governance such as the Plenary Powers of the United States Congress. Within their daily lives they experience the effects of broken treaties, loss of land and cultural rights, genocide and breaches of fiduciary duty. They are confronted by the constant battle with Congressmen and State Governors who wish to diminish their rights by framing "the economic and political empowerment of Indigenous tribes as evidence of a threatening tribal movement to transgress the temporal and spatial boundaries of colonial rule, consume American property and colonise the American political system."46 Resisting and diminishing Native American sovereignties also includes tactics such as positioning their claims outside racism which serves to protect and reinscribe possessive investments in the nation as a white possession. Some twelve months after its establishment, President Clinton was invited to discuss his Race Advisory Board with a panel of eight people on a PBS broadcast. One member of the panel was Native American Sherman Alexie. The panel discussed with Clinton a number of race issues including affirmative action. During the show Clinton did not address Native American sovereignty claims but tried to connect with Alexie by informing him that his grandmother was one-quarter Cherokee. Later in the program Alexie was asked if he was often engaged by others in discussions about race to which he replied that a dialogue often takes place when he is approached by people who "tell me they're Cherokee."41 In other words people do not talk about racism to Alexie unless they claim some form of Indigeneity. Alexie's comment serves to illustrate how Clinton tries to capitalize on a Native American ancestry by staking a possessive claim to a subject position that is not purely white in order to connect with his native brother while having excluded Native Americans from the Race Committee. Clinton can stake a possessive claim to Cherokee descent because there is no threat to his investment in his white identity, which carries a great deal of cultural capital enabling him to make the claim on biological grounds outside of Cherokee sovereignty. What Clinton was also signifying to the audience was that race does not matter: even a person of Cherokee descent can be President of the United States because this is the land of freedom, liberty and equality. A similar rhetorical strategy was also deployed in March 2008 by Barack Obama in his speech on race in Philadelphia, which was framed by the black/white binary operationalizing narratives of slavery and migration. Obama declared that slavery was the original sin in the making of the nation and it is the African American experience that dominates his speech though he acknowledges Latinos, Hispanics and refers to Native Americans once. His narrative on migration is reserved for white working and middle class people who he says feel they have not been privileged by their race, they have worked hard to build their dream but are now victims of globalization. **Obama stakes a possessive claim to whiteness throughout this speech by discursively operationalizing an American dream which is beyond race.** He stages this through an appeal to Christian principles, civil rights, patnotlsm, citizenship, liberty, freedom and equality noting that the Declaration of Independence was developed by men who "travelled across an ocean to escape tyranny and persecution."48 The tyranny and persecution inflicted upon Native Americans and slaves by white male possessors who framed the constitution is disavowed by Obama, who epitomizes them as the bearers of freedom and liberty. Clinton's executive and personal actions and Obama's speech serve[s] to negate Native American claims that race and racism were operating, when Indigenous peoples were dispossessed, and they continue to mark their everyday lives and sovereignty claims. The genealogy of racism toward Native Americans can be traced back to "Greek and Roman myths of warlike, barbarian tribes and biblical accounts of wild men cursed by God" which informed renaissance-era travel narratives describing them as the embodiment of primitive human savagery.49 Enlightenment theorists such as Locke and Hobbes developed their ideas of the state of nature utilizing the American Indian as the quintessential example of "humanity living in its pure, unadulterated savage state." These ideas operated discursively to inform theories about the rights of man within the context of the rise of democracy relegating Indigenous people to a state of nature without any sovereign rights. They continue to circulate preventing Indigenous sovereignties from gaining recognition as relevant and alternative visions of differently constituted modemities and global futures. The exclusion of Native Americans from the Race Committee correlates with their invisibility within the whiteness literature. Native Americans are located outside 'racism' because United States' status as a former colony and its current mode of colonization is separated from its historical narrative as being the land of liberty, freedom and equality. CONCLUSION I have shown that white possession operates discursively within the whiteness literature shaping analyses about its social construction and morphology which are divorced from its colonial history and colonizing present. Tropes of migration and slavery become the dominant narratives that inform analyses. The historical amnesia within the literature is tied to what white possession promises - migrants can become white and blacks can achieve racial equality. The selective historical amnesia mitigates the fear of opening oneself up epistemologically and onto logically to being a disoriented, displaced and diasporic racialized subject whose existence within the nation state is predicated on the continuing divestment of Indigenous people's sovereign rights. Instead it is the black/white binary that becomes the parameter for the constitution of whiteness by operationalizing blackness as an epistemological possession. Indigenous sovereignties within the USA are excluded from the whiteness literature because analyses of 'race' and ' whiteness' are sociodiscursively constituted by the racial contract and white possession which enable, constrain and discipline subjects in various ways within and outside the academy. White possession sets the limits of knowledge about the black/white binary disappearing beyond or behind the invention of this knowledge mediated through the racial contract. These practices of knowledge production work to deny Indigenous sovereignties as they reinforce the power, control and authority of the nation as a white possession. The work produced in the field of whiteness studies within the United States of America is written on and yet over the sovereign ground of Native Americans and Indigenous people from its other territories. While this literature does produce knowledge about whiteness and racism, there are powerful vested interests in not knowing Indigenous sovereignties and continuing to know Indigeneity in ways that confine it to a specialist domain of ethnographic expertise. The failure of this literature to address the explicit colonial and continuing imperialism of the nation state results in the writing off of Indigenous sovereignties in the service of white possession. This servicing produces a particular way of being racialized within the United States of America and is fundamental both to its establishment and to its continued existence.

#### The premise of their K is wrong- blacks do not start from the position of social death- their evidence is pure polemic

**Maty Ba, 11**

SAËR MATY BÂ, teaches film at Portsmouth University, September 2011 "The US Decentred: From Black Social Death to Cultural Transformation" book review of Red, Black & White: Cinema and the Structure of US Antagonisms and Mama Africa: Reinventing Blackness in Bahia, Cultural Studies Review volume 17 number 2 http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/csrj/index pp. 381–91 ,WYO/JF

**Red, White and Black is** particularly **undermined by Wilderson’s propensity for exaggeration and blinkeredness.** In chapter nine, ‘“Savage” Negrophobia’, **he writes**: The philosophical anxiety of Skins is all too aware that through the Middle Passage, African culture became Black ‘style’ ... **Blackness can be placed and displaced with limitless frequency** and across untold territories, by whoever so chooses. Most important, **there is nothing real Black people can do to either check or direct this process** ... Anyone can say ‘nigger’ because anyone can be a ‘nigger’. (235)7 Similarly, in chapter ten, ‘A Crisis in the Commons’, Wilderson addresses the issue of ‘Black time’. Black is irredeemable, he argues, because, at no time in history had it been deemed, or deemed through the right historical moment and place. In other words, the black moment and place are not right because they are ‘the ship hold of the Middle Passage’: ‘the most coherent temporality ever deemed as Black time’ but also ‘the “moment” of no time at all on the map of no place at all’. (279) Not only does Pinho’s more mature analysis expose this point as preposterous (see below), **I also wonder what Wilderson makes of** the **countless historians’ and sociologists’ works on slave ships, shipboard insurrections and/during the Middle Passage,8 or of groundbreaking jazz‐studies books on cross‐cultural dialogue like The Other Side of Nowhere (**2004). Nowhere has another side, **but once Wilderson theorises blacks as socially and ontologically dead while dismissing jazz as ‘belonging nowhere and to no one, simply there for the taking’, (225) there seems to be no way back**. It is therefore hardly surprising that **Wilderson ducks the need to provide a solution or alternative to both his sustained bashing of blacks and anti‐ Blackness**.9 Last but not least, Red, White and Black ends like a badly plugged announcement of a bad Hollywood film’s badly planned sequel: ‘How does one deconstruct life? Who would benefit from such an undertaking? The coffle approaches with its answers in tow.’ (340

#### Wilderson is wrong, reductionist, and essentialist

Ellison 11

(Mary, PhD, Fellow, African American and Indian American history and culture, Keele University, “Review of: Red, White and Black: cinema and the structure of US antagonisms”

[http://rac.sagepub.com/content/53/2/100.full.pdf+html?rss=1, Acc](http://rac.sagepub.com/content/53/2/100.full.pdf%2Bhtml?rss=1,%20Acc): 8/5/12, og)

These are two illuminating, but frustratingly flawed books. Their approaches are different, although both frequently quote Frantz Fanon and Jacques Lacan. Frank Wilderson utilises the iconic theoreticians within the context of a study that concentrates on a conceptual ideology that, he claims, is based on a fusion of Marxism, feminism, postcolonialism and psychology. He uses a small number of independent films to illustrate his theories. Charlene Regester has a more practical framework. She divides her book into nine chapters devoted to individual female actors and then weaves her ideological concepts into these specific chapters. Both have a problem with clarity. Regester uses less complex language than Wilderson, but still manages to be obtuse at times. Wilderson starts from a position of using ontology and grammar as his main tools, but manages to consistently misuse or misappropriate terms like fungible or fungibility. Wilderson writes as an intelligent and challenging author, but is often frustrating. Although his language is complicated, his concepts are often oversimplified. He envisions every black person in film as a slave who is suffering from irreparable alienation from any meaningful sense of cultural identity. He believes that filmmakers, including black filmmakers, are victims of a deprivation of meaning that has been condensed by Jacques Lacan as a ‘wall of language’ as well as an inability to create a clear voice in the face of gratuitous violence. He cites Frantz Fanon, Orlando Patterson and Hortense Spiller as being among those theorists who effectively investigate the issues of black structural non-communicability. His own attempts to define ‘what is black?’, ‘a subject?’, ‘an object?’, ‘a slave?’, seem bound up with limiting preconceptions, and he evaluates neither blackness nor the ‘red’ that is part of his title in any truly meaningful way.

#### Our form is good- Debate isn’t a site of antagonism- we can take our research skills, and apply them to how we operate in the rest of world, The decisionmaking skills and engagement with the state energy apparatus prevents energy technocracy and actualizes radical politics

Hager, Bryn Mawr College political science professor, ‘92

[Carol J., “Democratizing Technology: Citizen & State in West German Energy Politics, 1974-1990” *Polity*, Vol. 25, No. 1, p. 45-70, accessed 10-7-12, AFB]

During this phase, the citizen initiative attempted to overcome its defensive posture and implement an alternative politics. The strategy of legal and technical challenge might delay or even prevent plant construction, but it would not by itself accomplish the broader goal on the legitimation dimension, i.e., democratization. Indeed, it worked against broad participation. The activists had to find a viable means of achieving change. Citizens had proved they could contribute to a substantive policy discussion. Now, some activists turned to the parliamentary arena as a possible forum for an energy dialogue. Until now, parliament had been conspicuously absent as a relevant policy maker, but if parliament could be reshaped and activated, citizens would have a forum in which to address the broad questions of policy-making goals and forms. They would also have an institutional lever with which to pry apart the bureaucracy and utility. None of the established political parties could offer an alternative program. Thus, local activists met to discuss forming their own voting list. These discussions provoked internal dissent. Many citizen initiative members objected to the idea of forming a political party. If the problem lay in the role of parliament itself, another political party would not solve it. On the contrary, parliamentary participation was likely to destroy what political innovations the extraparliamentary movement had made. Others argued that a political party would give the movement an institutional platform from which to introduce some of the grassroots democratic political forms the groups had developed. Founding a party as the parliamentary arm of the citizen movement would allow these groups to play an active, critical role in institutionalized politics, participating in the policy debates while retaining their outside perspective. Despite the disagreements, the Alternative List for Democracy and Environmental Protection Berlin (AL) was formed in 1978 and first won seats in the Land parliament with 7.2 percent of the vote in 1981.43 The founders of the AL were encouraged by the success of newly formed local green parties in Lower Saxony and Hamburg,44 whose evolution had been very similar to that of the West Berlin citizen move-ment. Throughout the FRG, unpopular administrative decisions affect-ing local environments, generally in the form of state-sponsored indus-trial projects, prompted the development of the citizen initiative and ecology movements. The groups in turn focused constant attention on state planning "errors," calling into question not only the decisions themselves, but also the conventional forms of political decision making that produced them.45 Disgruntled citizens increasingly aimed their critique at the established political parties, in particular the federal SPD/ FDP coalition, which seemed unable to cope with the economic, social, and political problems of the 1970s. Fanned by publications such as the Club of Rome's report, "The Limits to Growth," the view spread among activists that the crisis phenomena were not merely a passing phase, but indicated instead "a long-term structural crisis, whose cause lies in the industrial-technocratic growth society itself."46 As they broadened their critique to include the political system as a whole, many grassroots groups found the extraparliamentary arena too restrictive. Like many in the West Berlin group, they reasoned that the necessary change would require a degree of political restructuring that could only be accomplished through their direct participation in parliamentary politics. Green/alternative parties and voting lists sprang up nationwide and began to win seats in local assemblies. The West Berlin Alternative List saw itself not as a party, but as the parliamentary arm of the citizen initiative movement. One member explains: "the starting point for alternative electoral participation was simply the notion of achieving a greater audience for [our] own ideas and thus to work in support of the extraparliamentary movements and initia-tives,"47 including non-environmentally oriented groups. The AL wanted to avoid developing structures and functions autonomous from the citizen initiative movement. Members adhered to a list of principles, such as rotation and the imperative mandate, designed to keep parliamentarians attached to the grassroots. Although their insistence on grassroots democracy often resulted in interminable heated discussions, the participants recognized the importance of experimenting with new forms of decision making, of not succumbing to the same hierarchical forms they were challenging. Some argued that the proper role of citizen initiative groups was not to represent the public in government, but to mobilize other citizens to § Marked 12:08 § participate directly in politics themselves; self-determination was the aim of their activity.48 Once in parliament, the AL proposed establishment of a temporary parliamentary commission to study energy policy, which for the first time would draw all concerned participants together in a discussion of both short-term choices and long-term goals of energy policy. With help from the SPD faction, which had been forced into the opposition by its defeat in the 1981 elections, two such commissions were created, one in 1982-83 and the other in 1984-85.49 These commissions gave the citizen activists the forum they sought to push for modernization and technical innovation in energy policy. Although it had scaled down the proposed new plant, the utility had produced no plan to upgrade its older, more polluting facilities or to install desulfurization devices. With prodding from the energy commission, Land and utility experts began to formulate such a plan, as did the citizen initiative. By exposing administrative failings in a public setting, and by producing a modernization plan itself, the combined citizen initiative and AL forced bureaucratic authorities to push the utility for improvements. They also forced the authorities to consider different technological solutions to West Berlin's energy and environmental problems. In this way, the activists served as technological innovators. In 1983, the first energy commission submitted a list of recommendations to the Land parliament which reflected the influence of the citizen protest movement. It emphasized goals of demand reduction and efficiency, noted the value of expanded citizen participation and urged authorities to "investigate more closely the positive role citizen participation can play in achieving policy goals."50 The second energy commission was created in 1984 to discuss the possibilities for modernization and shutdown of old plants and use of new, environmentally friendlier and cheaper technologies for electricity and heat generation. Its recommendations strengthened those of the first commission.51 Despite the non-binding nature of the commissions' recommendations, the public discussion of energy policy motivated policy makers to take stronger positions in favor of environmental protection. III. Conclusion The West Berlin energy project eventually cleared all planning hurdles, and construction began in the early 1980s. The new plant now conforms to the increasingly stringent environmental protection requirements of the law. The project was delayed, scaled down from 1200 to 600 MW, moved to a neutral location and, unlike other BEWAG plants, equipped with modern desulfurization devices. That the new plant, which opened in winter 1988-89, is the technologically most advanced and environmen-tally sound of BEWAG's plants is due entirely to the long legal battle with the citizen initiative group, during which nearly every aspect of the original plans was changed. In addition, through the efforts of the Alter-native List (AL) in parliament, the Land government and BEWAG formulated a long sought modernization and environmental protection plan for all of the city's plants. The AL prompted the other parliamentary parties to take pollution control seriously. Throughout the FRG, energy politics evolved in a similar fashion. As Habermas claimed, underlying the objections against particular projects was a reaction against the administrative-economic system in general. One author, for example, describes the emergence of two-dimensional protest against nuclear energy: The resistance against a concrete project became understood simul-taneously as resistance against the entire atomic program. Questions of energy planning, of economic growth, of understanding of democracy entered the picture. . . . Besides concern for human health, for security of conditions for human existence and protec-tion of nature arose critique of what was perceived as undemocratic planning, the "shock" of the delayed public announcement of pro-ject plans and the fear of political decision errors that would aggra-vate the problem.52 This passage supports a West Berliner's statement that the citizen initiative began with a project critique and arrived at *Systemkritik*.53 I have labeled these two aspects of the problem the public policy and legitima-tion dimensions. In the course of these conflicts, the legitimation dimen-sion emergd as the more important and in many ways the more prob-lematic. Parliamentary Politics In the 1970s, energy politics began to develop in the direction Offe de-scribed, with bureaucrats and protesters avoiding the parliamentary channels through which they should interact. The citizen groups them-selves, however, have to a degree reversed the slide into irrelevance of parliamentary politics. Grassroots groups overcame their defensive posture enough to begin to formulate an alternative politics, based upon concepts such as decision making through mutual understanding rather than technical criteria or bargaining. This new politics required new modes of interaction which the old corporatist or pluralist forms could not provide. Through the formation of green/alternative parties and voting lists and through new parliamentary commissions such as the two described in the case study, some members of grassroots groups attempted to both operate within the political system and fundamentally change it, to restore the link between bureaucracy and citizenry. Parliamentary politics was partially revived in the eyes of West German grassroots groups as a legitimate realm of citizen participation, an outcome the theory would not predict. It is not clear, however, that strengthening the parliamentary system would be a desirable outcome for everyone. Many remain skeptical that institutions that operate as part of the "system" can offer the kind of substantive participation that grass-roots groups want. The constant tension between institutionalized politics and grassroots action emerged clearly in the recent internal debate between "fundamentalist" and "realist" wings of the Greens. Fundis wanted to keep a firm footing outside the realm of institutionalized politics. They refused to bargain with the more established parties or to join coalition governments. Realos favored participating in institutionalized politics while pressing their grassroots agenda. Only this way, they claimed, would they have a chance to implement at least some parts of their program. This internal debate, which has never been resolved, can be interpreted in different ways. On one hand, the tension limits the appeal of green and alternative parties to the broader public, as the Greens' poor showing in the December 1990 all-German elections attests. The failure to come to agreement on basic issues can be viewed as a hazard of grass-roots democracy. The Greens, like the West Berlin citizen initiative, are opposed in principle to forcing one faction to give way to another. Disunity thus persists within the group. On the other hand, the tension can be understood not as a failure, but as a kind of success: grassroots politics has not been absorbed into the bureaucratized system; it retains its critical dimension, both in relation to the political system and within the groups themselves. The lively debate stimulated by grassroots groups and parties keeps questions of democracy on the public agenda.Technical Debate In West Berlin, the two-dimensionality of the energy issue forced citizen activists to become both participants in and critics of the policy process. In order to defeat the plant, activists engaged in technical debate. They won several decisions in favor of environmental protection, often proving to be more informed than bureaucratic experts themselves. The case study demonstrates that grassroots groups, far from impeding techno-logical advancement, can actually serve as technological innovators. The activists' role as technical experts, while it helped them achieve some success on the policy dimension, had mixed results on the legitimation dimension. On one hand, it helped them to challenge the legitimacy of technocratic policy making. They turned back the Land government's attempts to displace political problems by formulating them in technical terms.54 By demonstrating the fallibility of the technical arguments, activists forced authorities to acknowledge that energy demand was a political variable, whose value at any one point was as much influenced by the choices of policy makers as by independent technical criteria. Submission to the form and language of technical debate, however, weakened activists' attempts to introduce an alternative, goal-oriented form of decision making into the political system. Those wishing to par-ticipate in energy politics on a long-term basis have had to accede to the language of bureaucratic discussion, if not the legitimacy of bureaucratic authorities. They have helped break down bureaucratic authority but have not yet offered a viable long-term alternative to bureaucracy. In the tension between form and language, goals and procedure, the legitima-tion issue persists. At the very least, however, grassroots action challenges critical theory's notion that technical discussion is inimical to democratic politics.55 Citizen groups have raised the possibility of a dialogue that is both technically sophisticated and democratic. In sum, although the legitimation problems which gave rise to grass-roots protest have not been resolved, citizen action has worked to counter the marginalization of parliamentary politics and the technocratic character of policy debate that Offe and Habermas identify. The West Berlin case suggests that the solutions to current legitimation problems may not require total repudiation of those things previously associated with technocracy.56 In Berlin, the citizen initiative and AL continue to search for new, more legitimate forms of organization consistent with their principles. No permanent Land parliamentary body exists to coordinate and con-solidate energy policy making.57 In the 1989 Land elections, the CDU/ FDP coalition was defeated, and the AL formed a governing coalition with the SPD. In late 1990, however, the AL withdrew from the coali-tion. It remains to be seen whether the AL will remain an effective vehi-cle for grassroots concerns, and whether the citizenry itself, now includ-ing the former East Berliners, will remain active enough to give the AL direction as united Berlin faces the formidable challenges of the 1990s. On the policy dimension, grassroots groups achieved some success. On the legitimation dimension, it is difficult to judge the results of grass-roots activism by normal standards of efficacy or success. Activists have certainly not radically restructured politics. They agree that democracy is desirable, but troublesome questions persist about the degree to which those processes that are now bureaucratically organized can and should be restructured, where grassroots democracy is possible and where bureaucracy is necessary in order to get things done. In other words, grassroots groups have tried to remedy the Weberian problem of the marginalization of politics, but it is not yet clear what the boundaries of the political realm should be. It is, however, the act of calling existing boundaries into question that keeps democracy vital. In raising alternative possibilities and encouraging citizens to take an active, critical role in their own governance, the contribution of grassroots environmental groups has been significant. As Melucci states for new social movements in general, these groups mount a "symbolic" challenge by proposing "a different way of perceiving and naming the world."58 Rochon concurs for the case of the West German peace movement, noting that its effect on the public discussion of secur-ity issues has been tremendous.59 The effects of the legitimation issue in the FRG are evident in increased citizen interest in areas formerly left to technical experts. Citizens have formed nationwide associations of environmental and other grassroots groups as well as alternative and green parties at all levels of government. The level of information within the groups is generally quite high, and their participation, especially in local politics, has raised the awareness and engagement of the general populace noticeably.60 Policy concessions and new legal provisions for citizen participation have not quelled grassroots action. The attempts of the established political parties to coopt "green" issues have also met with limited success. Even green parties themselves have not tapped the full potential of public support for these issues. The persistence of legitima-tion concerns, along with the growth of a culture of informed political activism, will ensure that the search continues for a space for a delibera-tive politics in modern technological society.61

#### They actively trade-off with productive public non-competitive discourse outside of rounds—prefer our evidence because it’s specific to debate practice, not just academia

Atchison and Panetta 09

(Jarrod Atchison, Director of Debate @ Trinity University, and Edward Panetta, Director of Debate @ the University of Georgia, Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future, p. 317-34)

The larger problem with locating the “debate as activism” perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents’ academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community. If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more likely to occur outside a traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change through wins generates backlash through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed. From our perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive one where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try the method of public argument that we teach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of people.

#### Terminal Defense—speaking about race in a white symbolic economy like the debate community assures interpassivity—judges and debaters will talk the talk in debate rounds to feed their moral equilibriums without actually causing change. This is proven by straight up debaters who will usually read a hegemony aff, only to break a new soft-left aff to “cater” to “identity teams”

Pitcher 7

(associate editor of darkmatter. His book, The Politics of Multiculturalism <http://www.worldcat.org/title/politics-of-multiculturalism-race-and-racism-in-contemporary-britain/oclc/318674362> , is published by Palgrave Macmillan. He currently teaches sociology at the University of Westminster <http://www.westminster.ac.uk/schools/humanities/staff/social-and-historical-studies/pitcher,-dr-ben> //shree)

What is particularly interesting about these modern-day morality plays is the particular status of the racist act and the public response it engenders. The former **always constitutes a** great **Freudian slip of ethical propriety**: **it is**, of course, **never ‘really meant’**. Jade Goody, Patrick Mercer, even the policeman beating the shit out of Toni Comer – all of them are quick to deny they really are racists. **They were caught off-guard**, unawares, misconstrued. The amplification of their error across media platforms reminds us of Jeremy Beadle’s old-fashioned reality TV: they had, indeed, been framed. Compare this, then, to the popular response, where racism comes to be identified and named. **This theatre of mass disapproval is not**, in the main, **disingenuous**. When Ofcom came to be incorporated into the Big Brother drama as an alternative site for the registration of telephone votes, this was an organic manifestation of the popular politics of reality TV. It was a protest that was – at least in its origins – quite unorchestrated by the newspapers or other peripheral media. **The point to make here is not to challenge the sincerity of the reaction, but rather to consider the conditions under which such instances of impeccable anti-racism come to be expressed**. **All public discussion of race is today articulated from an anti-racist position**. Indeed, it is in fact the only position from which to speak: **it is not possible to mention the subject without stressing one’s anti-racist credentials**. All this is of course well and good: it should indeed be impossible to beg to differ. Yet it is at the same time still worth noting that **this ethical injunction on racist reference makes the anti-racist response a**n oddly **hollow act**, **for** if **to speak about race immediately places one in a superior position of judgment**, **then to do so is to simultaneously remove oneself from the field of racist practice**: **it excuses one from the possibility of being judged**. We are as a result operating according to a social logic where **racism only exists to be condemned**: the rapidly censored spillages from the racist unconscious channelled by the ‘misunderstood’ victims of reality TV have a single purpose, **and that purpose is to feed our disapprobation**. The popular spirit of anti-racism is not interested in much beyond these spectacular slips, for the sustained, longstanding and institutional facts of racist Britain cannot be booed off with a text vote to Ofcom. They are not amenable to the armchair activism that has seen anti-racism transformed into a cause for a twenty-first century green-ink brigade, treated as evidence of a lapse in public morality that might, in pruder times, have ranked alongside the display of nudity or the vocalization of a rude word. And so, beyond the excitement and public spectacle that appeared to invalidate Baudrillard’s neat pessimism, **we are witness to its confirmation in this strangely empty form of virtual reality racism**. The racist act or incident is entirely incidental, though it is – as in the case of Big Brother – always better if it takes place in a controlled environment. It is racism reduced to a resource, a material which feeds our popular ethics of anti-racism. The ideal form of virtual racism is a racism that seems to have had an essential property emptied out of it: it is a racism where nobody appears to get hurt. Our popular culture is on constant alert for this precious substance, always on its tantalizing trail. **We latch onto incidents upon which it can be hooked, temporarily pinned up for our audience, so that we can hold it before us and admonish it with full vigour**.